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Aug., 1953 .

DICTA

UNION PRACTICES PROHIBITED BY THE
FEDERAL AND STATE LABOR ACTS
WAYNE D. WILLIAMS
of the Denver Bar

This discussion deals briefly with federal and state jurisdiction over labor disputes, with union responsibility in unfair labor
practice cases, and with assorted unfair labor practices under
state and federal law, prominently, restraint, coercion, discrimination, and feather-bedding.
JURISDICTION OVER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

The principle of federal supremacy suggests that the problem
of jurisdiction over unfair labor practices ought to be approached
by determining the scope of the federal law, and in-that process
finding out what remains for control by the states.
The Taft-Hartley -Act was meant to apply the full reach of
the federal commerce power, and it gives the national Board jurisdiction over all unfair labor practices "affecting commerce."
Nevertheless, to avoid taking the time of the Board to hear
matters essentially local in nature, the Board, on October 3, 1950,
announced that in general it will act only in cases where the dollar
volume of interstate business done exceeds any of certain specified
amounts, depending upon the kinds of transactions measured;
and in cases involving public utilities, transit companies, instrumentalities of commerce, multi-state and national defense enterprises.' These requirements are not limitations upon the power
of the Board, but rather are guides which the Board will usually
observe in determining whether to exercise, its jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Board may take jurisdiction of a particular
case which falls outside the field described by these standards,
and the court may require the Board to do so, where the court
finds that the effect upon commerce2 of the activity complained of
in such a case is in fact substantial.
In addition to the powers of regulation which the states have
never surrendered over "local" commerce, whatever that now may
mean, it appears that the courts are marking out a few areas of
labor strife in which the states have jurisdiction concurrently
with the federal government.
For example, the U. S. Supreme Court has upheld the right
of a state, even in disputes affecting interstate commerce, to prohibit new labor techniques not protected under Taft-Hartley, at
least where injury to property and intimidation of employees are
present, and the court has explicitly reserved the question of the
'C.C.H. Labor Laic Reporter. p. 1615.
2 N. L.. R. B. v. Kobritz, 193 F. 2d 8
(1st Cir. 1951);
Association v. N. L. R. B., 193 F. 2d 833 (7th Cir., 1952).
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power of the states to act when a labor dispute creates a real
local emergency. In addition, several state courts have asserted
jurisdiction to enjoin secondary boycotts in interstate as well as
local commerce, and state courts have taken jurisdiction of injunction suits for violation of the collective bargaining agreement,
which is not an unfair labor practice under Taft-Hartley. In two
cases decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in February,
1953, it was held that Pennsylvania had no jurisdiction to enjoin
picketing which constituted an unfair labor practice under TaftHartley (picketing to force employer discrimination), but did
have jurisdiction to entertain a dispute involving
picketing which
3
Taft-Hartley neither protected nor prohibited.
In general, however, the matters of selection and certification
of bargaining units and representatives, the right to strike for
which Taft-Hartley recognizes as legitimate, and the regulation
of activities which are made unfair labor practices in Taft-Hartley,
are all withdrawn from state jurisdiction so far as the federal
commerce power extends. Thus, a state statute requiring a majority vote as prerequisite to a strike, requiring compulsory arbitration of all labor disputes involving public utilities, or authorizing state action in discrimination cases, is invalid when
applied
4
by a state to a dispute affecting interstate commerce.
The question of state and federal jurisdiction over labor disputes deserves a great deal more time than we are able to give it,
but perhaps the foregoing discussion at least suggests the problems that are encountered.
UNION RESPONSIBILITY

We come next to the question of the commission of unfair
labor practices on labor's side, and the principles for determining
responsibility for such practices. The Colorado statute provides
that an unfair labor practice may be committed by any employee.
Taft-Hartley is much more restrictive, and the unfair labor practices named in the federal act can be committed only by "a labor
organization or its agents." Accordingly, some attention must be
given to the principles from which the existence of an agency for
a labor organization is determined.
The federal act provides that in determining the matter of
agency "the question of whether the specific acts performed were
actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." This provision was intended to substitute common law principles of agency for the declaration in the Norris-LaGuardia Act
that unions could not be held responsible for the acts of their
officers and members without actual participation, authorization
or ratification after knowledge of the acts complained of.
3 Garner,
et al v. Teamsters' Union, 373 Pa. 19, 94 A. 2d 893 (1953);
American Brake Shoe Co. v. District Lodge 9, International Association of Ma-

chinists, 373 Pa. 164, 96 A. 2d 884 (1953).

4 For authorities in support of the above statements relative to jurisdiction,
and a good, detailed consideration of the subject, see note, "Federal and State

Jurisdiction over Labor Relations," 53 C.L.R. 258 (1953).
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In applying the new standard, the federal Board has held a
union responsible for acts of intimidation occurring in connection
with picketing, when instigated by union officials who had been
authorized to direct lawful picketing activities, for threats made
by the members of a union strike committee, and for coercion of
non-union members to join the union exerted by one holding general authority to solicit union membership. 5 The Board has, however, indicated that union membership alone is not sufficient to
create an agency, 6 and has held that a union which aided in establishing a picket line was not responsible for the acts of some of
the pickets who followed an employee away from the picket line
and coerced him respecting the union's objectives.7 In the case
last mentioned, the Board pointed out that the activity of the
picket had not been expressly authorized, and the union had not
established any pattern of unlawfully coercive acts which would
constitute implied authorization of the actions of the pickets.
Under what circumstances can the principle of respondeat
superior reach beyond the local union to the international or parent body? The cases upon this question do not afford a precise
guide. The mere affiliation of the local organization as a member
of the parent body has been held not to be a sufficient basis for
involving the responsibility of the latter, but if the parent organization actually undertakes to control the handling of a particular
dispute, especially through one of its own officials on the scene,
or finances it, there is likelihood that the Board will find international organization responsible in addition to the local union.8
CERTAIN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES CONSIDERED

A comparison of the unfair labor practice provisions of the
Colorado act with Taft-Hartley shows that the Colorado act is
considerably broader than the federal act, and designates as unfair labor practices a number of activities which Taft-Hartley
omits. Thus, the Colorado act makes it an unfair labor practice
to violate any collective bargaining agreement, or to refuse to
accept the final judgment of any tribunal having jurisdiction over
employment relations, or to commit any crime or misdemeanor
in connection with any controversy as to employment relations.
Most of the remaining activities on labor's side which are
rendered unfair labor practices by the Colorado act have some
counterpart in Taft-Hartley, and will be noted as we discuss the
practices prohibited by Taft-Hartley.
RESTRAINT AND COERCION

The first of the practices prohibited by Taft-Hartley is specified in Section 8(b) (1) of the federal act, and consists of restrain5Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948); International Longshoremen's
Union, 79 N.L.R.B. 1487 (1948).
OInternational Longshoremen's Union, supra, n. 5.
'Western, Inc., 93 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951).
'International Longshoremen's Union, supra, n. 5, and see note, "Union
Responsibility for Acts of Officers," 49 C.L.R. 384 (1949).
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ing or coercing employees in their rights to participate in or
refrain from organizing, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities for mutual aid or protection, or restraining or
coercing an employer in the selection of his own bargaining or
grievance committee representatives. A proviso in the subsection
preserves the right of unions to prescribe their own rules with
respect to acquiring or retaining union membership. The effect
of this proviso is that the union may deny membership to any
employee upon any ground, except failure to pay an excessive or
discriminatory initiation fee when there is in force a valid contract with the employer requiring union membership.
The real question under Section 8(b) (1) of the federal act
is what is meant by restraint or coercion? Clearly, any overt
violence forcing or causing employees affected by a particular
dispute to stay away from their employment or to join the union
amounts to restraint or coercion within the meaning of the act.
Three matters involving more doubtful questions of restraint
or coercion must be considered. The'first of these is whether mere
words alone can ever amount to restraint or coercion. The most
obvious case for responsibility is a threat of violence or injury
to person or property, and it has repeatedly been held that such
a threat is an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the
section. But how about the statement, "Boss, I want you to fire
those 2 men over there," when made by a union agent? If the
firing would be discriminatory within the meaning of the act, the
mere statement would probably be held to be coercive of the employees mentioned.9 The mere existence of an illegal closed shop
contract to which the union is a party has been held to restrain
employees in the exercise of their right not to join the union, even
though the restraint was not applied to any particular employees
or applicants for employment."'
Apart from words which are threats of violence, or which
constitute an attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
his employees unlawfully, mere speech does not constitute restraint
or coercion within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1). Thus in the
case of Western, Inc., already cited, it was held that peaceful
picketing during a strike which was called to enforce a secondary
boycott did not constitute restraint or coercion, even though the
purpose of the strike was unlawful.
Nor does mere name calling or vocally expressed resentment
constitute restraint or coercion. For pickets to call working employees "skunks," "rats" and the like is not a violation of the act.
Similarly, the threats "I'll get you" and "I know where you live,"
have been held to be too vague to constitute coercion under the
act, but "You'd better watch out because there may be trouble
later" was held coercive. 1
'Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Jarka Corp., 198 F. 2d 618 (3d Cir., 1952).
'"Jandel Furs, 100 N.L.R.B. No. 234 (1952).
" Perry Norvell Co., supra, n. 5; United Furniture Workers, 81 N.L.R.B.
886 (1949); United Mine Workers, 90 N.L.R.B. 436 (1950).
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The second matter deserving special consideration arises from
the fact that the words "restrain" and "coerce" imply that some
result in the behavior of employees or of an employer must occur
before restraint or coercion can be found to exist. Neither the
Board nor the courts, however, have taken this view. Instead,
and apparently on the basis of cases which arose under the Wagner Act, they have extended the act to hold that mere attempts at
restraint or coercion are prohibited by Section 8(b) (1). Thus,
where a union agent threatened an employee with injury if he
continued to work, the union was held to have violated Section
8(b) (1), even though the employee disregarded the threat and
continued to work. 12 Similarly, in the case of the illegal closed
shop contract mentioned, restraint of employees or applicants for
employment was found to exist even 13though no move had been
made to apply or enforce the contract.
Thirdly, it should be noted that it is restraint or coercion of
employees which Section 8 (b) (1) (A) prohibits. Notwithstanding
this use of the plural, "employees," it has been held that restraint or
coercion of a single employee violates the section, but this has
been done without any specific
consideration of the fact that the
14
word is plural in the act.
Suppose threats of violence are made to company officials
who are not employees within the meaning of the act. May such
threats amount to coercion of employees within the meaning of
Section 8(b) (1)? In the United Furniture Workers of America
case, the Board held that where union agents carrying clubs seized
a foreman by the arm saying, "No one goes in this morning," and
the occurrence was witnessed by employees, the employees had
been coerced respecting their rights in violation of Sction 8 (b) (1),
because they might reasonably consider that similar threats would
be made to them if they attempted to enter the plant.' 5
The Colorado act uses much the same terms as the federal
act in connection with restraint or coercion, and uses the singular,
"employee," instead of "employees," in describing restraint or
coercion. In addition, the Colorado act specifically names as unfair labor practives many coercive practices, such as mass picketing, intimidation, and sabotage.
CAUSING EMPLOYER TO DISCRIMINATE

The next unfair labor practice to be described is found in
Section 8(b) (2) of the Taft-Hartley Act, and consists of causing
or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee. The Colorado act contains a similar provision.
Employer discrimination against employees, under Section
"Progressive

Mine Workers v. N. L. R. B., 187 F. 2d 298 (7th Cir., 1951).
Mine Workers, supra, n. 11.
" N. L. R. B. v. Kingston Cake Co., 191 F. 2d 563 (3rd Cir., 1951); N. L.
R. B. v. United Construction Workers, 198 F. 2d 391 (4th Cir., 1952); Acme
Mattress Co., 91 N. L. R. B. 1010 (1950).

"United

. " Cited sitpra, a. 11.
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8(a) (3) of the act, is discussed in detail in another article in
this issue, and there is no need to extend that discussion here.
On the labor side, the unfair labor practice is to cause or attempt
to cause an employer to make such a discrimination.
The question of particular interest here is, what meaning
shall be given to the phrase "cause or attempt to cause?" During
the course of Taft-Hartley through the Congress this phrase was
"persuade or attempt to persuade." The conference report substituted the present phrase because, as Senator Taft explained, a
prohibition of mere persuasion would be inconsistent with the
free speech guarantees of the act. In practice, however, the phrase
"cause or attempt to cause" has been construed as if the section
still read, "persuade or attempt to persuade." Thus, peaceful
picketing, an unenforced closed shop contract, or even a mere
request for discharge of an employee have been held to constitute
attempts to cause employer discrimination. 6
Where a valid union shop contract is in existence the union
may, of course, bring about the discharge of an employee for
failure to pay valid dues or initiation fees without running counter
to the act. Failure to pay a fine imposed by the union, however,
is not a valid basis for requesting the discharge of an employee,
although the union might lawfully terminate the employee's union
membership for failure to pay the fine.
One further matter of special concern to unions in connection
with Section 8 (b) (2) practices is whether the section leaves them
any methods by which an employer may be encouraged to observe
the union's apprenticeship, experience or skill standards in the
employment of workmen. The unions have attempted to approach
this problem through the inclusion of provisions in the collective
bargaining agreement requiring the employer to notify the union
of any job vacancies as they occur, or providing for the establishment of a joint apprenticeship committee composed of representatives of the union and of the employer, or for the giving of competency tests to all applicants for specific employments. Any of
these provisions in a collective bargaining agreement is probably
lawful, so long as neither by the agreement nor by practices followed under the agreement is any discrimination
made between
17
members and non-members of the union. '
REFUSAL TO BARGAIN

Section 8(b) (3) of Taft-Hartley makes it an unfair labor
practice for the union or its agent to refuse to bargain collectively.
This subject, also, is discussed elsewhere in this issue, and I will
simply aftempt to fill in a few matters which arise particularly
on labor's side of the bargaining table.
,.Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 90 N.L.R.B. 1768
(1950), enforcement granted, 192 F. 2d 577 (10th Cir., 1951); N. L. R. B. v.
Jarka Corp., supra, n. 9.
"Compare, Evans v. International Typographical Union, 81 F.S. 675 (1948).
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The question of refusal to bargain comes up at some stage
of almost every contract negotiation, and the various demands and
policies which form the subjects of collective bargaining are too
numerous to mention. Generally speaking, however, any demand
by the union for a contract provision which the employer cannot
legally grant, or refusal to make any agreement at all, constitutes
a refusal to bargain on the part of the union.
Once the contract is made, bargaining is required upon questions of its application and interpretation, but Taft-Hartley relieves the employer of the duty to bargain concerning modifications
in an existing agreement until sixty (66) days from its expiration, at which time the union may serve a notice of proposed termination or modification of the contract, and initiate bargaining upon
the subject of a new contract as provided in Section 8 (d).
The act also relieves the employer of the duty, during the life
of a contract, to discuss matters bargained for in the negotiations
but not incorporated in the contract.
Unlike the Colorado act, Taft-Hartley does not define violations of a collective bargaining agreement to be unfair labor practices, although a right to sue for damages for the violation is
conferred, and a strike for modification or termination of a contract in force is a refusal to bargain.' 8 A proposal that breach of
the collective bargaining agreement be made an unfair labor practice was rejected by the Congress.
The Colorado act does not render mere refusal to bargain an
unfair labor practice, but does provide that violation of a collective bargaining agreement, and striking without giving the strike
notice required by the act, are both unfair labor practices.
SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
Section 8 (b) (4) of Taft-Hartley is discussed in Mr. Hornbein's article elsewhere in this issue.
REQUIRING EXCESSIVE OR DISCRIMINATORY FEES
Section 8(b) (5) renders it an unfair labor practice for the
union or its agents, when there is a lawful union security contract
in force, to exact initiation fees which the Board finds excessive
or discriminatory. This section is self-explanatory. The Colorado
act contains no matching provision concerning excessive or discriminatory fees.
FEATHER-BEDDING
The final unfair labor practice specified in Taft-Hartley is
feather-bedding. Section 8(b) (6) of the act makes it an unfair
labor practice for a union or its agents "to cause or attempt to
cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver
any money or other thing of value, in the nature of an exaction,
for services which are not performed or not to be performed."
We have already considered the meaning of the phrase "to
s Section 8(d), Taft-Hartley Act.

DICTA

Aug., 1953

-ause or attempt to cause" in connection with employer discriminations, and the phrase probably carries the same meaning in
connection with feather-bedditg.
What is, then, an exaction for services which are not performed or not to be performed? This question was the subject of
two very interesting cases decided recently by the U. S. Supreme
Court. Both of the majority opinions were written by Justice
Burton. The Chief Justice and Justice Clark dissented in both
cases, and they were joined in one case by Justice Douglas and
in the other by Justice Jackson. The American Newspaper Publishers Association case 19 came to the Court through the 7th Circuit upon an original complaint before the NLRB, charging that
a union practice of insisting that newspaper publishers pay typographers for reproducing advertising type, duplicating the asbestos mdts from which advertising is customarily printed, constituted an unfair labor practice under the feather-bedding provision of Taft-Hartley.
In the other case, the Gamble Enterprises 20 case, a practice
of the musicians' union was involved.
Prior to Taft-Hartley a local theatre in Ohio had paid the
minimum union wage to a local band composed of members of
the union every time a traveling or "name" band played at the
theatre, but the local musicians played no music. After TaftHartley, the union first demanded that the theatre manager pay
a local band to be in the pit while the "name" band played from
the stage of the theatre, the local musicians to play overtures,
intermissions, and "chasers." The employer declined to do this,
and the union refused to allow the "name" band to be scheduled.
Later, the union offered to withdraw its objection to traveling
band appearances if the theatre would guarantee to pay the local
musicians to play at the theatre on a number of unspecified occasions in proportion to the number of traveling band appearances
at the theatre. This offer was also refused, and a complaint by
the theatre before the NLRB resulted.
In both of these cases the Supreme Court held that no violation of Taft-Hartley had been committed by the union, and the
basis of the decisions was that each of the union practices questioned called for the performance of some service by the members
of the union. In reaching this result, the court examined very
fully, and sets forth in detail in the American Newspaper Publishers opinion, the legislative history of this provision of TaftHartley and concluded,
However desirable the elimination of all industrial
featherbedding practices may have appeared to Congress,
the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act .
demonstrates that when the legislation was put in final
"American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. N. L. R. B - ..... U
U.S ........- 73
S.Ct. 552 (1953).
" N. L. R. B. v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc.. ...... U. ....... 73 S.Ct. 560 (1953).
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form, Congress
decided to limit the practice but little
21
by law.
The Court held that the fact that the employer did not want
the services performed, and that they were not necessary to his
business, were immaterial. The only caution thrown out by the
Court was the statement, "There is no reason to think that sham
can be substituted for substance" 22 under Section 8 (b) (6), but
the Court explained that when the union demand contains a bona
fide offer of competent relevant services, no
unfair labor practice
2 3
has been committed in making the demand.
By dictum, the Court announced that had the musicians'
union continued its former practice of merely requiring the payment of a wage when no service was performed, a violation would
have been committed.
A further facet of the feather-bedding problem arises from
union demands for call-in pay, paid rest periods and vacation pay.
Such demands as these involve cases in which no services are performed, but it seems clear that the demands are lawful in the
light of Senator Taft's explanation in the Senate that demands
of this sort are not "in the nature of an exaction." They are, it
should be noted, demands for payment of wages to employees
whom the employer himself has selected and who regularly perform the work of the business. In neither the American Newspaper Publishers case nor the Gamble Enterprises case did the
majority opinion discuss the meaning of the phrase "in the nature
of an exaction."
The Colorado act as to feather-bedding is again much broader
than Taft-Hartley, and renders it an unfair labor practice to
demand from the employer pay for any employee not required
by him or necessary for his work. Keeping in mind the legislative
history of the feather-bedding provision of Taft-Hartley, it seems
clear, however, that Colorado lacks jurisdiction to apply this provision in any situation affecting interstate commerce.
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